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 The confluence of Joe Biden’s election to the 
White House, the likely ramifications of the 
pandemic for defence budgets, and unfolding 
EU and NATO strategic reflection processes 
offers a window of opportunity to replace 
NATO’s flawed 2% defence spending target. 
Europeans should credibly propose an output-
oriented metric to reconstitute the transatlantic 
bargain on burden-sharing. 
 
NATO only just survived the presidency of 
Donald Trump. At the heart of his pathological 
disdain for the alliance was his conviction that 
other allies ripped off the US, with Germany the 
favourite target for his tirades. Transatlantic 
disagreements about burden-sharing are hardly 
new, however, and will not disappear with 
Trump’s unceremonious departure from the 
White House. And some of Trump’s instincts 
were not erroneous as several European allies 
indeed underspend on defence, leaving their 
armed forces ill-equipped to adequately 
contribute to NATO missions.  
 
The principal problem with American 
accusations of unequal burden-sharing is not 
necessarily their substance – though it is at times 
overblown – but the benchmark against which 
allies’ contributions are measured. At the Wales 
Summit in 2014, allies agreed to ‘reverse the trend 
of declining defence budgets’ and ‘aim to move 
towards’ spending 2% of GDP on defence and 
20% of their defence budgets on major new 
equipment and research & development. Only 
half of the allies are currently on track to meet the 
2% target by the deadline of 2024, and Donald 
Trump exploited this evident failure to 
relentlessly berate the Europeans.  
 
THE FLAWS OF THE 2% TARGET  
Beyond developing into public relations disaster 
for the alliance so keen on projecting unity, the 
2% target suffers from at least three inherent 
flaws. First, fixating on defence spending per 
GDP leads to the absurd scenarios that countries 
with contracting economies increase their relative 
commitments even if their absolute spending 
stagnates or falls – Greece is a recent case in point 
– and vice versa. The adverse impact of the 
pandemic on economic growth could thus lead to 
more allies meeting the 2% target if their GDP 
 
 





shrinks quicker than defence budgets, which tend 
to be time lagged. The IMF calculates that GDP 
of advanced economies contracted by 5.9% in 
2020.   
 
Second, the 2% target is based on the seductively 
simplistic assumption that greater spending 
inevitably translates into greater capabilities for 
NATO. This view neglects that not all military 
spending is actually directed at NATO objectives. 
While European capabilities, with the partial 
exception of British and French, by and large 
serve NATO, US capabilities also serve alliances 
and commitments in Asia and the Middle East. 
One study finds that the US spends merely 5% of 
its defence budget directly toward European 
security. Moreover, defence budgets contain 
extraneous items – like pensions – which do not 
profit NATO. In turn, EU defence spending is 
also plagued by inefficiencies resulting from 
excessive duplication and fragmentation. EU 
member states operate 178 major weapon 
systems (30 in the US), 17 types of tanks (1 in the 
US), 29 types of destroyers and frigates (4 in the 
US), and 20 types of fighter planes (6 in the US). 
Military readiness has suffered as a result as 
military spending has not yielded proportional 
capabilities. More spending without greater 
pooling and coordination would thus be at risk of 
just petering out.  
 
Third, the 2% benchmark ignores allies’ actual 
operational contributions to NATO missions 
(e.g. in Afghanistan or Iraq) or NATO’s 
rotational forward presence to deter Russia from 
Eastern Europe. The case of Denmark is 
illustrative, as Copenhagen plans to only spend 
1.5% of GDP on defence by 2023 but is widely 
considered one of the most active allies in 
contributing to coalition operations. The 
extremely narrow conception of burden-sharing 
also excludes other types of spending that 
contribute to NATO objectives such as 
development assistance to create stability in 
NATO’s neighbourhood.  
  
In light of the deteriorating security environment 
in Europe’s neighbourhood, Russian foreign 
adventurism in Ukraine and beyond, growing 
militarization across the globe, and incipient great 
power rivalry between the US and China, it is 
imperative for European NATO members to 
commit greater defence and security efforts. But 
pretending that transatlantic burden-sharing is 
simple enough for a crude 2% figure to capture it 
only plays into the hands of populists like Donald 
Trump. This begs two questions: 1) what should 
an alternative metric look like? and 2) how can 
Washington be persuaded of its merits? 
 
THE ALTERNATIVE: AN OUTPUT-
ORIENTED METRIC   
The new metric should follow the logic of output, 
not input. That is, the new metric should focus 
on allies’ actual practical contributions to NATO 
objectives in order to assess fair burden-sharing 
rather than vacuous macroeconomic figures. In 
fact, NATO itself uses not merely the two 
headline-grabbing spending targets to assess 
allies’ contributions – 2% and 20% – but also 
output-oriented benchmarks including the 
percentage of national armed forces that are 
deployable and sustainable, the extent to which 
capability planning targets identified by NATO’s 
Defence Planning Process (NDPP) are 
implemented, and actual contributions to NATO 
operations and its command structure. While 
these criteria have hardly any political traction in 
transatlantic debates on burden-sharing, they 
provide a good starting point.  
 
There are two potential forms the new metric 
could take, which reflect competing visions for 
the future of NATO. First, it could be fairly 
narrow and be based on two pillars: allies’ direct 
and measurable capability provisions and troop 
 
 





contributions. Here, the NDPP would continue 
to identify capability requirements for objectives 
approved by the Defence ministers, apportion 
responsibilities, and monitor the implementation. 
For the first time since the end of the Cold War, 
all capability targets were actually apportioned 
among the allies in the last cycle of the NDPP 
(2014-2018) – a remarkable achievement 
drowned out by the 2% spat. Hence, NATO 
leaders need to make a concerted political effort 
to elevate the importance of the NDPP for 
effective transatlantic burden-sharing in public 
debates.  
 
To reinforce the centrality of the NDPP, NATO 
should also further strengthen it. At present, the 
NDPP lacks an enforcement mechanism, which 
renders the realisation of capability targets 
patchy. While the intergovernmental nature of 
NATO makes it unfeasible to bestow 
enforcement powers onto the International Staff, 
NATO could be more transparent, within the 
bounds set by secrecy requirements, in publishing 
its reviews of allies’ progress on meeting their 
targets to name and shame underachievers (the 
NATO Capability Report). It should also be 
better linked to the EU’s Coordinated Annual 
Review on Defence to create synergies and 
prevent duplications. Troop contributions could 
be measured by the extent to which allies already 
deploy troops for NATO objectives.   
 
Second, should NATO’s future lie in 
transcending its core tasks to also address new 
security challenges and foster resilience, the 
metric would need to be more expansive and 
include a third pillar: non-military contributions 
to Euro-Atlantic security such as development 
assistance, capacity building, fight against 
disinformation, or climate change mitigation 
spending. Avoiding the inherent flaws of input-
based benchmarks would require the alliance to 
arrive at common objectives for these third-pillar 
contributions. An expanded NATO Defence and 
Security Planning Process (NDSPP) could set 
targets for development spending in Afghanistan, 
climate change mitigation spending in Syria, or 
capacity building in Libya. Such a conceptual 
transformation would offer a holistic reflection 
of contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and 
thus a more sophisticated measure for burden-
sharing, but it risks blurring NATO’s raison 
d’etre and entangling the alliance in tasks it is ill-
equipped for.  
 
Regardless of whether NATO’s future will be as 
a narrow alliance or expansive security 
organisation, the main challenge of replacing the 
2% benchmark with either of these metrics is 
political not technical. The US, alongside those 
few allies who consistently meet the spending 
requirements, will be sceptical, if not outright 
hostile, toward what they may perceive a self-
serving ploy by European laggards to evade 
pulling their weight. The European proposal to 
replace the 2% benchmark must therefore go 
hand in hand with a discernible upping of their 
commitment to ease the American burden in 
Europe and its southern neighbourhood – for 
example by taking over the air defence of the 
Baltics – and allow the US to focus on the Indo-
Pacific. And some European allies will still have 
to spend more on defence to correct operational 
deficits. Despite increases of its defence budget, 
a recent report by the German parliamentary 
ombudsman for instance laid bare significant 
gaps in personnel (20 000 officer positions are 
unfilled) and equipment in the German armed 
forces. 
 
A UNIQUE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR 
BURDEN-SHARING REFORM 
While persuading the US will be difficult, there is 
currently perhaps a unique window of opportunity 
given the confluence of three conditions favourable 
to reform. First, Joe Biden’s presidency offers new 
 
 





room for transatlantic engagement. During the 
campaign, Biden has made clear that he intends to 
rebuild American alliances and his selection for the 
foreign policy team reflect this. He should be more 
willing to discard dogma and engage in actual 
deliberations with the Europeans on how to revamp 
NATO.  
 
Second, the likely effect of the pandemic on defence 
budgets reinforces the logic of focussing on outputs 
rather than inputs. Not only will the 2% benchmark 
become less meaningful as economies contract. The 
financial costs of Covid will also put great pressure 
even on maintaining, not to say increasing, current 
levels of spending. As a result, allies will have to spend 
smarter and make more with less. Setting output 
targets would thus encourage allies to rationalise their 
highly inefficient defence spending by reforming 
procurement processes and providing additional 
incentives for EU member states to pool their defence 
efforts; at present, the lack of cooperation among EU 
member states is estimated to cost between 25 billion 
Euros and 100 billion Euros annually.  
 
Third, both NATO and the EU currently embark 
upon strategic reflection processes, which open the 
institutional space for debating a new spending 
benchmark. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has 
launched the NATO2030 process and is likely to push 
this year for developing a new Strategic Concept to 
develop common visions on strategic objectives, threat 
perceptions, and required reforms. In turn, the EU is in 
the midst of the Strategic Compass exercise aimed at 
developing a mid-range strategy to translate EU 
priorities identified in the EU’s Global Strategy of 2016 
into tangible goals and capability requirements. The 
Strategic Compass should help clarify the divisions of 
labour between the EU and NATO and could thereby 
provide a clearer set of tasks for NATO as a foundation 
for a new output-oriented metric.  
 
NATO therefore has a golden opportunity to devise 
a meaningful metric that will not only facilitate the 
alliance meeting the diverse security challenges of the 
2020s but also reconstitute the transatlantic bargain. 
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